S
ince the spring of 2014, there has been a vibrant debate in the scientific community about the benefits and risks of so-called gain-of-function (GOF) studies involving pathogens with pandemic potential and particularly highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) (1) . In October 2014, the U.S. government announced a pause for research involving GOF experiments with three respiratory viruses-influenza virus, Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) coronavirus, and severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) coronavirus-if that research could be "reasonably anticipated" to enhance their pathogenicity or transmissibility (http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2014/10/17/doing-diligence -assess-risks-and-benefits-life-sciences-gain-function-research), a pause that is currently in effect. In the same month, the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) met to discuss the ongoing controversy after a 2-year lull when it did not convene following a prior controversy involving the publication of papers describing experiments involving the acquisition of transmissibility by HPAIVs (2) . During the October 2014 meeting, the NSABB heard presentations for and against the continuation of GOF studies. The situation today finds well-intentioned and well-informed scientists on both sides of a controversy that echoes the DNA recombination debates of the 1970s, which culminated in the Asilomar conference (3). The ongoing debate is very important because it has the potential to affect certain aspects of the future direction of microbiological research. Consequently, these days of intense debate may one day be seen as an important historical time in the development of the microbiological sciences. In the past, mBio has provided a forum for discussion on this topic (4, 5) . In this new series, we continue that tradition by including articles that delineate views in favor of and against the GOF experimentation pause, discuss the lexical morass created by the continuing use of the GOF terminology, and describe how information obtained from GOF studies is starting to be used by scientists concerned with influenza preparedness. Our goal is to provide a record of some of the arguments being made in this debate, in the words of some of the participants, to inform both the present and the future. We note that the NSABB is currently deliberating recommendations regarding the pause and that the National Academy of Sciences has convened a meeting for December 2014 on the same topic. We recognize that in such a complex debate, any collection of essays can represent only a fraction of the existing views. For those readers who have views that have not been aired to date, we note that mBio does consider letters to the editor and has published several letters on this topic in recent issues. We are hopeful that with this collection of essays, mBio will be making a contribution to finding the best way forward, as scientists, government officials, and the public grapple with the complex issues unveiled by GOF experimentation involving pathogens with pandemic potential (PPP).
